Abstract-We consider the verification of current-state and K-step opacity for systems modeled as interacting nondeterministic finite-state automata. We describe a new methodology for compositional opacity verification that employs abstraction, in the form of a notion called opaque observation equivalence, and that leverages existing compositional nonblocking verification algorithms. The compositional approach is based on a transformation of the system, where the transformed system is nonblocking if and only if the original one is current-state opaque. Furthermore, we prove that K-step opacity can also be inferred if the transformed system is nonblocking. We provide experimental results where current-state opacity is verified efficiently for a large scaled-up system.
I. INTRODUCTION
While there is a large amount of information people willingly release everyday, there is some information that we wish to remain secret. Thus, various notions of security have been studied in the past decades; opacity is one such example. Opacity is an information flow property that identifies whether or not a secret is released to an external observer of the behavior of a known dynamic system. We refer to the external observer as the intruder in this paper.
The notion of opacity was introduced in the field of discrete event systems in [1] , where the system is modeled as a Petri net. Later, a variety of notions of opacity were introduced to cope with different security requirements. Current-state opacity [2] , initial-state opacity [3] , initial-and-final-state opacity [4] , K-step opacity [5] , [6] , infinitestep opacity [7] , and language-based opacity [8] are some examples of state-based and language-based opacity notions. In [4] , polynomialtime algorithms are presented to transform the verification of current-state, initial-state, initial-and-final-state opacity, and language based-opacity to one another. In this paper, we study the verification of current-state and K-step opacity under the framework of modular discrete event systems. A system is said to be current-state opaque if the intruder can never know for sure that the current state of the system is a secret state. On the other hand, a system is K-step opaque if the intruder cannot determine if the system had entered a secret state within the K previous steps of its observed behavior (i.e., it is a smoothing property in system-theoretic terminology).
In this paper, we consider a class of modular systems that are modeled as partially observed (or nondeterministic) interacting finite state automata. The monolithic approach to verify any opacity property for modular systems is to synchronize all the components of the system and then use the corresponding verification algorithm on the resulting monolithic system. This approach is limited by the well-known state-space explosion problem, when composing a large number of components.
Abstraction and modular approaches are standard techniques that can be used to alleviate the state-space explosion problem, either independently or jointly. In the opacity verification problem domain, the verification of initial-state opacity in a modular setting was studied in [9] , where it is shown that the system is initial-state opaque if and only if the strings causing violations of opacity are disabled by synchronization. Bisimulation was used in [10] to reduce the complexity of the system when verifying infinite-step opacity. One method to alleviate the state-space explosion problem is the compositional approach based on abstraction. This approach is well developed for nonblocking verification and supervisor synthesis in modular systems [11] - [14] . The compositional approach seeks to remove and merge states that are redundant for the purpose of verification or synthesis, and it proceeds in an incremental manner in terms of components.
This paper presents a novel compositional approach for the verification of current-state, infinite-step, and K-step opacity. As infinitestep opacity is a limiting case of K-step opacity, we mainly focus on current-state and K-step opacity. In our framework, each component is abstracted using a restricted version of observation equivalence or weak bisimulation [15] , that we call opaque observation equivalence. After such abstraction, the current-state estimator (CSE) [16] or the two-way observer [17] of each component is generated, depending on which opacity property is to be verified, either current-state or K-step. Next, the opacity verification problem is transformed to a nonblocking verification problem. This makes it possible to use well-developed nonblocking verification algorithms to verify the different notions of opacity. In the case of current-state opacity, we show that the transformation to nonblocking leads to an equivalent problem, i.e., we show necessity and sufficiency. In the case of K-step opacity, we show sufficiency of the transformation. We used the software tool Supremica [18] to verify current-state opacity of a large modular system using our compositional approach. Specifically, we have successfully verified current-state opacity for a large system containing 4·10 3 automata under 1 min.
The presentation of our results is organized as follows. Section II gives a brief background about different notions of opacity. Section III explains the general compositional opacity problem. Next, Sections IV and V explain the compositional approach for current-state and K-step opacity, respectively. Our experimental results on a scaled-up example are presented in Section VI. Finally, some concluding remarks can be found in Section VII. Formal proofs of results can be found in [19] .
II. MODELING FRAMEWORK

A. Automata and Their Composition
Discrete system behaviors can be modeled by deterministic or nondeterministic automata.
Definition 1: A (nondeterministic) finite-state automaton is a tuple We assume that the intruder can only partially observe the system. Thus, Σ is partitioned into two disjoint subsets, the set of observable events and the set of unobservable events. In this paper, we assume that the unobservable events are local to each component. Since the identity of unobservable events is irrelevant, they are all replaced by a special event τ . The event τ is never included in the alphabet Σ, unless explicitly mentioned. For this, Σ τ = Σ ∪ {τ } is used [11] . Nondeterministic automata, hereafter, may contain transitions labeled by τ . However, since τ represents unobservable events, deterministic automata will never have τ transitions. In opacity problems, the set of states is also partitioned into two disjoint subsets: Q S the set of secret states and Q NS = Q\Q S the set of nonsecret states. When automata are brought together to interact, lock-step synchronization in the style of [20] is used.
Definition 2:
be two nondeterministic automata, with sets of secret states Q S 1 ⊆ Q 1 and Q S 2 ⊆ Q 2 . The synchronous composition of G 1 and G 2 is defined as
(1) where
and where the set of secret states of G, Q S , is defined in one of the two following ways.
Importantly, this definition of synchronous composition only imposes lock-step synchronization on common events in Σ.
In the following, whenever necessary, we use the notations ∧ and ∨ to show that the secret states of synchronous composition are defined as in Definition 2 (i) or (ii), respectively. When ∧ is used, a synchronized state is considered secret if all the composed states are secret. In ∨ , however, if one of the states of the synchronized state is secret, then the synchronized state is considered secret. ∨ and ∧ are the first natural constructs for joint secrecy. For simplicity, we only focus on ∨ but the results can be specialized to ∧ by suitable adjustment. More detailed results on ∧ are presented in [19] . Σ * is the set of all finite traces of events from Σ, including the empty trace ε. The natural projection P τ : Σ * τ → Σ * is the operation that removes from traces t ∈ Σ * τ all events not in Σ, which affects only event τ in our setting.
The transition relation of an automaton G is written in infix notation 
⇒}. Thus, we do not include event τ in the strings in the language of an automaton. Moreover, from Definition 2, it follows that s ∈ L(G 1 G 2 ) if and only if P 1 (s) ∈ L(G 1 ) and P 2 (s) ∈ L(G 2 ), where 
→ x} and all states are considered to be initial [4] .
• obs is a deterministic automaton, where X Also, we will refer to the observer automaton as the CSE.
In this paper, the special blocking event ψ / ∈ Σ is used to label additional transitions going out of a special set of states, termed ψ-states and denoted by X ψ .
Definition 3:
is a deterministic automaton such that ⊥ is a new state, Q m = Q, meaning all the original states are marked, and
This "ψ-transformation" will be used later on to transform opacity verification to nonblocking verification. To check if a specific state of the system can be reached, the state can be considered as a ψ-state and nonblocking verification can be done on the transformed system, termed the ψ-system. In our setting, the ψ-states are the states that violate opacity.
Another common automaton operation is the quotient modulo an equivalence relation on the state set.
Definition 4:
Let Z be a set. A relation ∼ ⊆ Z × Z is called an equivalence relation on Z if it is reflexive, symmetric, and transitive. Given an equivalence relation ∼ on Z, the equivalence class
B. Notions of Opacity
In general, opacity addresses the issue whether an intruder observing the system, and knowing the model of the system, can determine for sure if the system is in a secret state. There are different notions of opacity in the literature. It is shown in [4] that initial, final, currentstate, and language-based opacity can be transformed to one another with polynomial-time algorithms for verification purposes. Moreover, infinite-step opacity is a limiting case of K-step opacity. Thus, in this paper, we mainly address the verification of current-state opacity first, and then that of K-step opacity, which cannot be transformed to current-state opacity for verification purposes. We recall the formal definitions of these properties in the context of the framework of this paper.
Definition 6: A nondeterministic automaton G with event set Σ and set of secret states Q S is current-state opaque, with respect to Q S if and only if
The system is current-state opaque if an intruder cannot determine whether the system is currently in a secret state or not.
Definition 7: A nondeterministic automaton G with event set Σ and set of secret states Q S is infinite-step opaque, with respect to
The system is infinite-step opaque if an intruder cannot determine whether the system ever was in a secret state or not at any time in the past.
Definition 8: A nondeterministic automaton G with event set Σ and set of secret states Q S is K-step opaque, with respect to
The system is K-step opaque if the entrance of the system into a secret state remains uncertain for an intruder after up to K future observations. Hence, 0-step opacity is equivalent to current-state opacity, and when K → ∞, then K-step opacity becomes infinite-step opacity [7] .
It is shown in [16] that current-state opacity can be verified by building the standard observer automaton.
Proposition 1:
• be a nondeterministic automaton with set of secret states Q S . Let det(G) = Σ, X obs , → obs , X
• obs be the CSE of G. Then, G is current-state opaque with respect to Q S if and only if for all
The verification of infinite-step and K-step opacity is considered in [5] and [7] , respectively, where these properties were first introduced. Recently, a new approach for the verification of infinite and K-step opacity was introduced, which relies on building the so-called two-way observer of the system [17] . We will leverage this latter approach in the development of our results. Again, we recall relevant definitions and results, restated in the context of our framework.
Definition 9 (see [17] ):
• be a nondeterministic automaton and G R be the reversed automaton of G.
Proposition 2 (see [17] ): 
III. COMPOSITIONAL OPACITY VERIFICATION
This section describes the general framework of transforming current-state opacity and K-step opacity to nonblocking verification. Since infinite-step opacity is a limiting case of K-step opacity, a specific treatment of this property is omitted hereafter; instead, we make relevant observations about it in our discussion; see Section V. Note that current-state opacity is also a special case of K-step opacity. However, since verification of current-state opacity requires building the CSE and not the two-way observer, we address current-state opacity separately from K-step opacity.
The input to the algorithm is a modular nondeterministic system. A modular system is a collection of interacting components
The compositional opacity verification algorithm is summarized in Fig. 1 and the steps are as follow. 1) At the first of the compositional opacity verification, the modular system (2) is abstracted, using opaque observation equivalence. Each automaton G i may be replaced by an abstracted version,G i , with less states or transitions. 2) Next, the CSEs, in the case of current-state opacity verification, or the two-way observers, in the case of K-step opacity verification, of the individual abstracted components are built, H i in Fig. 1 .
3) Next, the opacity verification problem is transformed to nonblocking verification problem. The states of the individual CSEs or the two-way observers that violate opacity are identified and transitions to blocking states from those states are added, resulting in H i,ψ i in Fig. 1 . 4) Compositional nonblocking verification is used to verified opacity problem. In compositional nonblocking verification, the synchronous composition is computed gradually, abstracting each intermediate result again. Eventually, the procedure leads to a single automaton, denoted byH, which due to the abstraction process has less states and transitions compared to the original system. OnceH is found, it is used for nonblocking verification. The system is current-state opaque if and only ifH is nonblocking and it is K-step opaque ifH is nonblocking. Our motivation for proceeding as above is that compositional nonblocking verification has been well studied and it has shown very promising results [11] , [12] .
The monolithic approach to verify opacity, first synchronizes all the component of the system and builds the monolithic CSE or two-way observer of the system. As the number of the states of the synchronized product grows exponentially with the number of components, the complexity of building the CSE or the two-way observer of the whole system is O(2 |X | n ). In contrast, the complexity of generating modular CSEs or two-way observers, instead of their monolithic counterparts, is O(2 |X | ), which is significantly smaller. In addition, the proposed approach, in this paper, not only avoid building synchronized product of the whole system, but it also abstracts the components and reduces the number of the states of each component before the construction of CSEs or two-way observers. Fig. 1 illustrates the steps of compositional opacity verification for the case of ∨ .
IV. COMPOSITIONAL CURRENT-STATE OPACITY VERIFICATION
This section describes compositional current-state opacity verification. First, Section IV-A describes the abstraction methods that preserve current-state opacity. Next, Section IV-B describes that individual CSEs can be built instead of the monolithic CSE. Finally, Section IV-C explains the transformation of current-state opacity verification to compositional nonblocking verification.
A. Opaque Observation Equivalence
At the first stage of compositional opacity verification, individual nondeterministic components are replaced by their abstracted opaque equivalent components, step (i) in Fig. 1 .
Observation equivalence is a well-known abstraction methods [21] to abstract the state space of an automaton. Observation equivalence considers states to be equivalent if they have outgoing transitions while ignoring the unobservable events (namely, event τ in our set-up).
Definition 10 (see [21] ):
• be a nondeterministic automaton. An equivalence relation ≈ ⊆ Q × Q is called an observation equivalence on G, if the following holds for all x 1 , x 2 ∈ Q such that x 1 ≈ x 2 : if x 1 s ⇒ y 1 for some s ∈ Σ * , then there exists y 2 ∈ Q such that x 2 s ⇒ y 2 , and y 1 ≈ y 2 . In order to use observation equivalence for abstraction in our compositional opacity verification methodology, the set of secret states needs to be taken into account. For this purpose, a restricted version of observation equivalence called opaque observation equivalence is defined.
Definition 11: 2) x 1 ∈ Q S if and only if x 2 ∈ Q S . Opaque observation equivalence considers two states to be equivalent if they have the same secret property and from both of them equivalent states can be reached by the same sequences of events aside from the τ event.
We present our first result on the use of opaque observation equivalence in the verification of opacity. (In the sequel, for the sake of simplicity of notation, we will denote the event set of nondeterministic automata by Σ, with the understanding that some transitions may be labeled by τ .)
Theorem 3: Let G = {G 1 , . . . , G n } be a nondeterministic system with ∨ for interaction, where each automaton has set of secret states Q S i . Hence, the set of secret states of the system is Q S = Q\Q NS , where
Then, G is current-state opaque if and only ifG is current-state opaque.
Theorem 3 illustrates that the components of a modular system that are interacting by ∨ can be abstracted using opaque observation equivalence while preserving the current-state opacity property.
B. Synchronous Composition of CSEs
The idea of compositional opacity verification is to abstract the components and construct the CSE for each abstracted component and, next, transform opacity verification to compositional nonblocking verification. For this approach to work, it needs to be shown that current-state opacity is preserved by synchronization of individual CSEs, step (ii) in Fig. 1 . In the following, Proposition 4 first shows that synchronization of CSEs produces an automaton that is isomorphic with the monolithic CSE of the original system, det(G). Then, Theorem 5 shows that the current-state opacity of a system can be verified by constructing the CSEs of individual components and then synchronizing them by using ∨ . The following proposition has been presented and proved in [22, Ch. 5], Proposition 5.5.
Proposition 4 (see [22] ):
Proposition 4 shows that the CSEs of the components of a system can be constructed individually. The idea of this paper is to transform the opacity verification problem to compositional nonblocking verification problem. Since the input to compositional nonblocking verification is a set of automata, it is essential for the proposed algorithm to keep the modular structure of the system.
The following theorem shows that current-state opacity is preserved by synchronization of the individual CSEs.
Theorem 5: Let G = {G 1 , . . . , G n } be a nondeterministic system with ∨ for interaction, where each automaton has set of secret states Q S i . Hence, the set of secret states of the system is Q S = Q\Q NS , where
Theorem 5 proves that a system is current state opaque if and only if no state of the modular CSE lies entirely in the set of secret states. The set of secret states in Theorem 5 is defined based on ∨ . 
C. Current-State Opacity to Nonblocking Verification
So far, we have shown that the components of a modular system can be abstracted using opaque observation equivalence and the CSEs of individual abstracted components can be built. This section describes the transformation of compositional opacity verification to nonblocking verification, steps (iii) and (iv) in Fig. 1 . These steps are done after creating the modular CSEs. The compositional approach is well-established for nonblocking verification [11] , [12] . A variety of abstraction methods with efficient implementations that preserve the nonblocking property are introduced in [11] , [12] . Thus, transforming current-state opacity to nonblocking verification makes it possible to use well-developed algorithms for nonblocking verification. To transform current-state opacity to nonblocking verification, the first step is to identify the states of individual CSEs that are violating opacity. These states are considered as ψ-states in Definition 3. From these states, transitions to blocking states are added. The system is current-state opaque if and only if the transformed system is nonblocking.
In the following, Theorem 6 formally describes how to transform current-state opacity to nonblocking verification when ∨ is used.
Theorem 6: Let G = {G 1 , . . . , G n } be a nondeterministic system, with ∨ used for interaction, where each automaton has set of secret states Q S i . Hence, the set of secret states of the system is Q S = Q\Q NS , where
When ∨ is used for composition, then the system is not current-state opaque if at least one state of the composed states is secret. To capture this feature, individual components G i have different ψ i -transitions. This guarantees that if the transformed system is blocking, then there is a composed state in the original system with at least one secret state. When ∧ is used for interaction, a composed state is considered secret if all the states are secret. To assure this, in the transformed system all the components have the same ψ-transitions. Thus, the ψ-transitions happen if and only if they happen in all the components simultaneously.
The following example shows all the steps of compositional currentstate opacity verification.
Example 1: Consider the system G = {G 1 , G 2 }, where G 1 and G 2 are shown in Fig. 2 Fig. 1. Fig. 2 shows det(G 1 ) and since G 2 is deterministic, det (G 2 ) = G 2 . The next step in the compositional approach is to transform opacity verification to nonblocking verification by building the ψ-automata of the individual components, step (iii) in Fig. 1 = {{t 1 }}. The ψ-automata of det(G 1 ) and det(G 2 ) are shown in Fig. 2 as O 1 and O 2 , respectively. The transformed system is blocking Fig. 1 . Thus, we can conclude that the original system is not current-state opaque when ∨ is used for interaction. Indeed, the system is not current-state opaque as if α occurs in the monolithic system, then G 1 ∨ G 2 goes to the secret states (s 1 , t 1 )  or (s 2 , t 1 ) , from where there is no possible denial.
V. COMPOSITIONAL K-STEP OPACITY VERIFICATION
This section discusses the compositional approach for K-step opacity verification. Since infinite-step opacity is a special case of K-step opacity, in this section, we mainly focus on K-step opacity and we discuss throughout how the results can be extended to handle infinitestep opacity verification. As in the case of current-state opacity, the first step of compositional K-step opacity verification is to abstract the individual components. This is described in Section V-A. Next, Section V-B presents the construction of two-way observers of individual components and Section V-C shows how K-step opacity verification can be transformed to nonblocking verification.
A. Opaque Observation Equivalence
The idea of K-step opacity is that the intruder cannot determine if the secret state was reached within K-step prior to the current state. As opaque observation equivalence only merges states with the same secrecy property and the same future behavior, K-step opacity is preserved by opaque observation equivalence, step (i) in Fig. 1 . This is shown in Theorem 7.
Theorem 7: Let G = {G 1 , . . . , G n } be a nondeterministic system with ∨ for interaction, where each automaton has set of secret states Q S i . Hence, the set of secret states of the system is Q S = Q\Q NS , where
As opaque observation equivalence only merges states with the same future behavior, the lengths of the strings remain consistent after abstraction. Therefore, K-step opacity is preserved by opaque observation equivalence.
B. Synchronization of Two-Way Observers
It is shown in [17] that the two-way observer can be used to verify infinite-step and K-step opacity. In order to monolithically verify K-step opacity of a modular system, the monolithic representation of the whole system is generated first. Next, the two-way observer of the system is constructed; see Definition 9. This approach requires generating two observer automata for two potentially large components, which maybe intractable. The compositional approach, on the other hand, avoids constructing the monolithic two-way observer of the system. Instead, the two-way observers of the components are built individually, step (ii) in Fig. 1 . However, we do not get isomorphism, as was the case for CSEs in Section IV-B. Namely, we show in Proposition 8 that the monolithic two-way observer of the system is a subautomaton of the composed individual two-way observers. The property of subautomaton is denoted by and we refer the reader to [23] for its definition.
Proposition 8: Let G 1 and G 2 be two nondeterministic automata. Let G i,R be the reversed automaton of G i for i = 1, 2 and let G R be the reversed automaton of
where X R and Y R are the states of G R .
Proposition 8 only establishes that the monolithic two-way observer of a modular system is a subautomaton of the synchronous product of the individual two-way observers; in contrast toProposition 4 isomorphism does not hold in general. The reason is that when the monolithic representation of the system is built, some combinations of states may become unreachable, or some transitions may become disabled. However, those unreachable states may become reachable when individual reversed automata are composed. This happens because in the reversed automaton, all the states are considered as initial states and consequently reachable states.
To verify infinite-step or K-step opacity, the two-way observers of the system components need to be generated. As established in Proposition 8 the synchronization of the two-way observers of individual components provides an overapproximation of the state space of the monolithic two-way observer of the system. This overapproximation may cause some unreachable states that are violating infinite-step or K-step opacity to become reachable. Thus, if the modular verification of the overapproximated two-way observer results in infinite-step or K-step opacity, it can be concluded that the original system is also infinite-step or K-step opaque. However, if the result shows a violation of infinite-step or K-step opacity, then further investigation is needed to confirm that the violation is not the result of reaching (in the overapproximation) a state that is actually unreachable.
Theorem 9: Let G = G 1 ∨ . . . ∨ G n be a nondeterministic system, where each automaton has set of secret states Q S i . Hence, the set of secret states of the system is Q S = Q\Q NS , where
be the two-way observer of G i and let
Theorem 9 establishes a sufficient condition for K-step opacity verification when ∨ is used for synchronization. Essentially, the theorem looks at all reachable states of the modular two-way observer, which contain states in which the (nonempty) intersection of the two components lies entirely in the set of secret states. If such states are reached after up to K observations, then the system is K-step opaque.
If the verification of infinite-step opacity is of interest, then K = ∞. Since the condition |P Δ (s)| > K in Theorem 9 becomes always false, the condition [∃(
= ∅] needs to be negated. Thus, a sufficient condition for infinite-step opacity is that all reachable states of the modular two-way observer do not contain a state that is a (nonempty) subset of the set of secret states.
C. K-Step Opacity to Nonblocking Verification
The main idea of this paper is to transform opacity verification to nonblocking verification and use existing nonblocking verification algorithms. To transform K-step opacity verification to nonblocking verification, the ψ-automata of the two-way observers need to be built.
First, the states of the two-way observers that violate K-step opacity are identified and from them transitions to blocking states are added, steps (iii) and (iv) in Fig. 1 .
Theorem 10: Let G = G 1 ∨ . . . ∨ G n be a nondeterministic system, with set of nonsecret states Q
Theorem 10 establishes that when the transformed system is nonblocking, we can conclude that the original system is K-step opaque. However, if the result of nonblocking verification is negative (blocking), then the system could still be K-step opaque. This problem arises for two reasons. First, it can be caused by the overapproximation of the state space of the two-way observer, as was explained in Section V-B. Second, it may also be caused by overapproximation of X 
The following example shows all the steps of modular K-step verification.
Example 2: Consider the system G = {G 1 , G 2 }, where G 1 and G 2 are shown in Fig. 2 . The set of secret states of G 1 is Q S 1 = {s 1 , s 3 } and that of G 2 is Q S 2 = ∅. Assume ∨ is used for interaction and onestep opacity needs be verified. First, individual components are abstracted using opaque observation equivalence, step (i) in Fig. 1 . This results in the abstracted systemG = {G 1 , G 2 } withQ Fig. 2 . Next, the two-way observers of the abstracted components are generated, step (ii) in Fig. 1 . The two-way observers of G 1 and G 2 are H 1 and H 2 ; shown in Fig. 3 . Next, 1-step opacity verification is transformed to nonblocking verification by generating the ψ i -automaton for each H i , step (iii) in Fig. 1 = ∅. Fig. 3 shows
Thus, no conclusion can be drawn about the one-step opacity of the system, step (iv) in Fig. 1 .
is reached due to overapproximation. The problem of overapproximation is caused by the reversed automata of the twoway observers. From Δ(det(G 1 )) Δ R (det(G 1 ,R )) Δ(det(G 2 )) Δ R (det(G 2 ,R )) 
VI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, compositional current-state opacity verification is tested on a scalable example. The example consists of two players, A and B, that are moving in a house. To enter each room of the house the players need to use the corresponding key. One of the rooms is a "two-person rule" room, which means that to open that room the presence of the two players is required. Fig. 4 shows the model of the players.
In the model of the players, event u i,j means that player i has unlocked room j. Player A starts at room R 1 , from which the player can go to room R 2 . Room R 3 is the two-person rule room and event u 3 is a shared event between the two players. This shows that both players can enter room R 3 only if they are at room R 2 simultaneously. After entering room R 3 , player A can either unobservably go to room R 4 , which is a secret room for player A, and then return to room R 3 , or it can go to room R 5 . From room R 5 , player A can return to the initial room R 1 . Player B can start either at room R 1 or R 2 . From room R 3 , player B can go back to the initial room R 1 or it can go to room R 5 and from there go back to the initial room R 1 . However, room R 5 is a secret room for B. The example can be scaled up by adding serially connected houses or increasing the number of players.
We have used Supremica [18] to test the scalability of our compositional methodology for current-state opacity verification on the above example. The model is scaled up by adding up to 2000 players or having up to 2000 serially connected houses (using || ∨ ). All tests were run on a standard laptop using a quad core CPU at 2.6 GHz. Our methodology does not use any prior knowledge about the system. Table I shows the results of the experiments. For each model, the table shows the number of automata (Aut.) and whether the system is current-state opaque (Opaque). The table also shows the runtime for calculating opaque observation equivalence, the runtime for constructing the CSE of all the components, and finally the runtime for nonblocking verification. Even though the compositional approach has no prior knowledge about the system, the models can be verified in a short time.
VII. CONCLUSION
We introduced a novel methodology for verification of current-state and K-step opacity in modular discrete event systems. The methodology supports compositional reasoning using the notion of opaque observation equivalence that we defined, which guarantees that currentstate and K-step opacity are preserved properties. After abstracting the components, the opacity verification problem is then transformed to a nonblocking verification problem. This makes it possible to use existing compositional methods for nonblocking verification of modular systems. Under our methodology, the system is current-state opaque if and only if the transformed system is nonblocking. In addition, it can be concluded that the system is infinite-step opaque or K-step opaque if the transformed system is nonblocking. Our experimental results suggest that the compositional approach that we have presented can lead to significant computational gains over a monolithic approach.
